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Political Science

Chinese-Built Dams, Africa, and Economic Growth: Is There a Role
for African NGOs? *
MATTHEW TODD BRADLEY
Indiana University Kokomo
ABSTRACT
This paper will investigate the impact of Chinese-built dams in Africa, the
economic and political impacts, and what roles African NGOs (nongovernmental
organizations) play. As the continent of Africa continues to shed its “paper tiger”
status in the postcolonial era and continues to become a potential economic
powerhouse, what role will African NGOs play? The primary goal of this paper
is to discern the role of African NGOs in the face economic growth, especially in
the area of Chinese-built dams (a growing segment of economic growth in Africa
as “engines” of industrialization).
KEY WORDS Chinese-built dams; African NGOs

As the continent of Africa continues to witness spurts of economic growth in the
postcolonial era, will we see more transparent evidence of similar growth patterns in political
liberalization, specifically in the area of civil society? One of the “engines” that will continue to
propel economic growth is dams, which provide hydroelectric power for the growing energy
demands of industrialization. That “engine,” however, will have to consider the potential negative
impacts on communities such as residential displacement, environmental degradation, and
continued wealth disparities in already fragile communities. Moreover, what roles (if any) will
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play in a linear, deterministic model (see, for example,
Rostow 1960) of economic development? But perhaps we might also consider if NGOs should
play a role. Typically, as countries mature politically and economically, space opens up for civil
society actors in the form of pluralism. Thus, one would think that there will be space in which
NGOs can facilitate discussions, gather information, and keep the public abreast of the economic
(and political) stakeholders in “developing” states.
Currently, two-thirds of the total electricity production in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding
South Africa) comes from hydropower (US EIA 2004). Concurrent with the need for energy and
economic expansion are calls for democratization, which typically are in tandem with economic
growth, at least in most Western models of glasnost and perestroika, but Africa presents a unique
case study, not only in its path to economic growth but also in its “dependent autonomous” (Lu
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2009) state-civil society relations. Moreover, African NGOs are stymied by the push for
privatization and other forms of economic liberalization. This economic liberalization is
quintessentially a Western model of economic development, which may be contrary to some
components of economic growth in parts of Africa. As a result, there have been calls by African
NGOs to be cautious about privatization. For example, in its millennial development report in
2005, in Goal Seven, the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) stated, “We
support the expansion of essential services such as electricity and clean water supply to all, and
oppose their privatization. This means that we must halt the policies of privatization and
‘liberalization’ which lead to the concentration of public resources in fewer and often nonnational hands.”
Costs beyond the economic realm—that is, social costs (housing displacements, agrarian
lifestyle displacements), environmental costs (environmental degradation, water temperature
changes, sediment buildup), and political costs (exacerbating elitism in already politically fragile
countries)—are indisputable areas of concern. What roles could African NGOs play in
minimizing these cleavages? NGOs can help ensure “best options” practices (Hathaway and
Pottinger 2009:172). Conversely, what are some of the hydroelectric power benefits for Africa?
The benefits include relatively low electric costs, heating, and manufacturing power; power grids
for urban and rural areas; more FDI (foreign direct investment); better infrastructure; and greater
predictability in terms of energy availability.
In the postcolonial era, African NGO activists continue to experiment with various
models of civil society growth (e.g., Dibie and Dibie 2008) in the midst of spurts of economic
growth, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, some African activists have adopted
the Western-style model of NGO organization and agitation—that is, no official intrusion by the
government (but occasional state funding), whereas others have adopted a more user-friendly
version of NGO organization and activity (i.e., direct intrusion by the state, including funding,
bureaucratic mandates, and institutional structure). The fluidity of NGO models in Africa in the
midst of increased globalization illustrates that one size certainly does not fit all. African NGOs
must be framed in a non-Western civil-society framework. Just as important for civil society
studies, a wider discussion is needed for researchers to understand the complexities of economic
liberalization and tempered political liberalization, especially in quasi-democratic societies.
Moreover, civil society actors and hydroelectric dam-affected social movements are concerned
that China’s own poor record of protecting human rights and the environment could mean trouble
for African rivers now targeted for ongoing Chinese-built large dams. Not only is Africa ripe for
a growing source of raw materials (as in the colonial era for the Western powers) for China’s
industrial sector, but Africa is also a marketplace for Chinese exports. Consequently, Chinese
companies are heavily involved in many areas of industrialization: oil, mining, logging, and
infrastructure, but at what costs to Africa?
Africa’s economic systems are in a state of flux, as many African countries slowly
relinquish their socialist, agrarian-based economy to a more market- and capitalist-based
economy, but various political systems are still quite static or rigid in terms of creating structural
and nonstructural (e.g., education, insurance policies for property owners) institutions. As well,
most of the African economies are still quite stagnant because of the low levels of political
liberalization in terms of civil liberties and rights. As a result of this asymmetrical relationship,
some private businesses are beginning to forge patron-client networks that allow private business
to develop types of NGOs that have some level of impact outside of the business realm; however,
these “arms” of private businesses have not meant a concurrent increase in civil society activism.
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A caveat: as researchers and practitioners, we must move beyond the confines of Western-style
myopic modeling because, after all, one size does not fit all, whether in political and economic
systems or non-state activism. During the 1980s and 1990s, increasing numbers of civil-society
actors exposed the World Bank and other donors of dam projects for overlooking the hazards and
residuals of the impacted communities throughout Africa. As a result of the grassroots activism,
the World Bank agreed to review the effects and created in 1998 an “independent” watchdog
group, the World Commission on Dams (WCD; Hathaway and Pottinger 2009). The WCD’s final
report was issued in 2000, however. Such an ad hoc approach to such a salient issue begs the
question, why stop now, especially as the need for electricity grows with increasing levels of
industrialization and globalization in Africa? Also, it appears that most of the dams being built in
Africa are connecting the industrial and urban centers, as distribution networks (Hathaway and
Pottinger 2009), while neglecting the rural communities as a source of utility power. This type of
neglect only exacerbates the political, economic, and social cleavages in Africa, which further
complicates the work of the NGOs but at the same time creates opportunities for the NGOs and
their spheres of influence. In addition, institutional relationships between African NGOs and
Chinese multinational corporations in the area of hydroelectric dam construction could be
enhanced, which may “spill over” into more calls for democratization efforts in the areas of civil
rights and civil liberties in nascent African democracies.
THE CASE FOR WIDENING NGO NOTIONS IN THE MIDST OF GLOBALIZATION
First, there are varying degrees of fairness, equality, and justice when discussing
sustainable development (Dibie and Dibie 2008), which further complicates NGO efforts in
postcolonial Africa. In addition, globalization creates certain expectations (some positive, some
negative), including trade openness, cultural partnerships (and cultural losses, which at times
include loss of ancestral burial grounds), political liberalization, increased levels of predictability
and trust between participants. There are many faces or components of globalization, including
economic and political (Sharma 2008). Moreover, increased tensions are becoming more apparent
regarding the role that NGOs should play in policy formation, such as in environmental policy
(Fisher and Green 2004). In the case of African NGOs, most have some level of decentralized
organizational structure, which means that they have some level of latitude and thus liberty to
pursue various avenues of social, political, and/or economic justice. Even with a level of latitude,
however, the African NGOs continue to face an uphill battle with domestic and foreign corporate
interests, as well as their own governments, as such actors mostly pursue short-term goals of
profits without genuinely considering the long-term social, cultural, and economic costs of
hydropower projects. Moreover, the corporatist model or vertical orientation (Salmenkari 2008)
of African NGOs and Chinese relations deemphasizes social autonomy and encourages a
corporatist type of relationship. A caveat: researchers should be cautious of such explanations,
because they appear to be culturally deterministic and linear, analogous to modernization theory.
The following cases illustrate (and generally mirror the other African cases) the potential
economic growth and infrastructure development in select African countries.
African NGOs in the midst of hydroelectric dam construction must also consider the
African Model Law, in terms of privatization of the Chinese-built dams. The African Model Law
“deals with bio-safety, access, and benefit-sharing with respect to genetic resources” (Zerbe
2007:97). Even though Zerbe’s analysis deals with African farmers’ rights, the notion that
African NGOs should be “at the table” is highlighted by the fact that the hydroelectric dams have
meant huge rural residential (and thus farmer) displacements and crop devastation. After all,
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“environmental problems are increasingly characterized by their transboundary nature” (p. 99),
that is, moving beyond one’s own state borders. In addition, stronger transnational civil-society
ties between African NGOs and Chinese multinational corporations perhaps could play a role
because environmental issues (and beyond) would be seen as a vested joint interest, as is the case
in mitigating ethnic and racial suspicion with the newly arrived Chinese laborers in Africa
(Campbell 2008). Early on in the development of the African Model Law (early 1990s), it mostly
dealt with only the question of access and benefit-sharing; however, later in the 1990s, it included
provisions on plant breeders’ rights as well, because such rights “represent the most important
entry point into control over local genetic resources” (Zerbe 2007:110). So, what would such
crucial rights have to do with African NGOs and hydroelectric dams?
In the context of the African Model Law, farmers as plant breeders might mean that
African NGOs in their environmental efforts could partner with local farmers as a way to stave
off (or at least mitigate) the negative impacts of acres of arable land needed for dam construction.
The African NGOs and farmers could tout sustainable development in the midst of increasing
globalization. More broadly, discussions regarding intellectual property rights in biodiversity, as
well as the “no patents on life” campaign advocated by others (e.g., GRAIN) recently, represent
serious challenges for African NGOs. One of the implications of the “no patents on life”
campaign essentially means that hydroelectric dam development carries land ownership by the
Chinese hydroelectric dam company and thus by default threatens life (natural plant production
and human life). While such measures may appear innocuous, they actually have a negative
impact on nurturing the political process (thus civil society) in already tenuous democracies. As
African NGOs consider collaborating with international NGOs, however, perhaps they can
minimize such negative externalities while fostering the political process and can maximize
societal welfare more broadly. In other words, how can African NGOs facilitate Chinese
hydroelectric dam production while helping to minimize the negative externalities and nurturing
the political process to maximize societal welfare?
AFRICA’S ECONOMIC MODEL
Contrary to W.W. Rostow’s (1960) linear Western path of five stages to economic
growth, most of Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, has remained in the first stage (traditional
or agrarian society). Thus, this stage presents enormous tasks for African NGOs to not only
minimize the negative impacts of the hydroelectric dams but also cultivate the political process.
Obviously, a few urban centers have moved beyond the primordial stage (of economic growth
and governance), including Johannesburg, Harare, and Nairobi. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen its
ratio of trade to GDP (gross domestic product) either remain flat or decline. Thus, for many of
these countries, the problem is not their impoverishment on account of globalization but rather
being excluded from globalization (Lindert and Williamson 2003). Moreover, Western models
(e.g., Rostow’s) of economic development (domestic economic liberalization policies, increased
free trade, FDI) perpetuated not by anti-state institutional policy choices but rather by “strong
man” (dictatorial) rule has exacerbated the primordial stage of economic growth. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, a “developing” model of economic growth (including structural adjustment programs, or
SAPs; primitive accumulation of native African peasant farmers; defensive modernization to
protect certain precious commodities like water) can be stimulated by state institutional policy
choices to augment political liberalization.
African NGOs nurture the political processes (in the midst of the negative externalities of
Chinese dam production) in Uganda and Zambia by exercising influence in the areas of land and
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water rights. For example, the Ugandan constitution was amended in 1995, and Article 78 (Fifth
Schedule), Section 3 has a consequential impact on the NGOs. In part, the article (de facto)
provides an opportunity for Ugandan NGOs, working in tandem with regional governmental
officials, to influence public policy in the area of land and water issues, which are undoubtedly
related to dam construction. Moreover, under the auspices of the Committees of the Regional
Assembly, subsections (f) and (g) specifically refer to cultural or primordial (traditional) clan
lands and sites. Furthermore, under the patronage of the regional government, subsection (i)
specifically discusses the issue of water and goes on to discuss “coordination and monitoring of
land use in the region.” Thus, in this sense, Rostow’s model, or perhaps most models of Western
economic development, may be antithetical to Uganda (and perhaps much of Sub-Saharan
Africa). The Ugandan constitutional measures focus on social rights (e.g., land and water),
whereas Western models of economic development tend to focus more on macro-notions of
growth, including technological competitiveness and individualistic opportunities. Consequently,
Ugandan NGOs (and, more broadly, African NGOs) have the ability to influence public policies
not only at the national level but also at the regional and local levels, which is where most
citizenry will feel the impact of the political process.
The Zambian constitution of 1996 (which amended the 1973 and 1991 constitutions)
allows for traditional chiefs in the policy-making process, which opens the door for Zambian
NGOs to play a role in the political process. Such a scenario may ignite ethnic- and religiousprone politics in an already tenuous democracy, but Zambian NGOs at least may have an ally
outside of the mainstream political processes of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government in Zambia. Part XIII (Article 127) of the Zambian constitution notes that “the
Institution of Chief is (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Institution of Chief
shall exist in any area of Zambia in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes
and aspirations of the people to whom it applies. (2) In any community, where the issue of a
Chief has not been resolved, the issue shall be resolved by the community concerned using a
method prescribed by an Act of Parliament.” Moreover, Article 129 (Chief Not to Be Partisan)
states, “A person shall not, while remaining a Chief, join or participate in partisan politics.” Thus,
there is a type of checks and balances on the possible whims of the ethnic- and religious-prone
politics of the institution of chiefs. In the next section, I consider types of African NGO
involvement in Chinese-built hydroelectric facilities and operationalize levels of involvement
with notions of minimal, medium, and high.
OPERATIONALIZING MINIMAL, MEDIUM, AND HIGH LEVELS OF AFRICAN NGO
INVOLVEMENT
The following section represents a sample of the levels of NGO involvement in
hydroelectric dam processes in Africa. The particular cases are illustrative and thus mirror the
levels (minimal, medium, and high) of involvement throughout the continent. An operational
definition of the various levels is as follows: By minimal involvement, NGOs are relegated to
observer status regarding discussions between Chinese companies and national/local government
authorities, especially in non-pluralistic governing systems such as the Sudan, whereas medium
involvement means that certain criteria must be included in any discussions related to
hydroelectric dam construction—criteria such as forming policy and adequately addressing issues
of minimizing residential and crop displacements—and possible monetary compensation
(although Chinese companies typically have not met this criteria). Lastly, high involvement
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means ongoing dialogue with Chinese multinational corporations and (possible) profit-sharing
with the impacted local communities.
UGANDA
The case of Uganda represents a high level of NGO activism. Why is NGO activism
relatively high in Uganda? The National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE)
of Uganda (www.nape.or.ug) has been at the forefront of nurturing a culture of challenging the
status quo or business-as-usual mantra as it relates to dam construction. NAPE also has a
lobbying magazine to help get its message out to the public, not just domestically but also
internationally. Since the NGO’s founding in 1997, it has been at the vanguard of energy and
environmental governance, water resources management, forest and wetlands management,
human rights and justice, and chemicals management. Not only have NAPE’s ongoing
environmental impact assessments (EIA) challenged the Ugandan government to respond and be
more proactive in mitigating ever-present environmental concerns brought on by hydroelectric
dams, but NAPE has also challenged the World Bank for its involvement in dam construction.
Moreover, a recent report highlights the level of high commitment on the part of NAPE and other
civil-society actors to hold the Ugandan government accountable. For example,
The National Association of Professional Environmentalists
(NAPE), together with other Civil Society Organizations in
Uganda working on environment and energy issues has
developed a civil society geothermal guide for Uganda. Uganda
is endowed with a rich geothermal potential mainly located in
the rift valley parts of the country. Preliminary studies on the
resource indicated that the country’s geothermal potential could
be as high as 450 MW or even more. Today, the energy
consumption pattern in Uganda is estimated to be 90% of
biomass-based energy, 5% of petroleum products and about 6%
of electricity however, only about 2% of the rural population
have access to electricity. The high dependence on biomass
energy has resulted in an estimated annual wood consumption of
about 20 million tons. This threatens the sustainable utilization
of the country’s forest resources. On the other hand, high
consumption of imported fossil fuels is responsible for taking a
considerable percentage of the country’s already low per capita
income. By the year 2002, an estimated 430,000 tons of fossil
fuels were being consumed in Uganda per annum but has
continued to grow steadily all through the years. Despite this
high potential, harnessing of the resource in the country is yet to
be realized. Although government has for some time expressed
interest of developing it, several decades have gone by without
the commitment being translated into reality. There are many
explanations for the slow progress and these include: lack of
political will, the presumed high cost for geothermal
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development in relation to large dam-based hydropower and
environmental concerns. (Geoffrey 2010)
ZAMBIA
The Republic of Zambia represents some (medium) level of NGO involvement in daily
affairs, including activism in dam construction and policy-formation. Moreover, Zambia’s
Interim Report (chapter 14) of the Mung’omba Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) notes
the progression of the growth of NGOs in this country, as we
came out of one-party state to multi-partyism. This has meant
moving from early “social welfare” groups (e.g., Red Cross,
Rotary Club), to “development” groups (e.g., those focusing on
issues such as environment, rural development, gender), to
“governance” groups (e.g., those mobilizing people around
issues such as human rights, elections, corruption).
Additionally, the Bill of Rights section of the 1996 Zambian constitution explicitly states that
civil society will be protected. Zambian-based NGOs have been adamant about protecting
residents and have been outspoken about adequate rehabilitation in the affected communities. As
promising as those NGO efforts appear, however, the activism has been tempered by the hopes of
the Zambian government that dam construction will ultimately increase its citizens’ overall wellbeing.
Lastly, the Table 1 represents other hydroelectric dams currently being financed by the
government of China and/or Chinese corporations as “tools” or “engines” to modernize Africa but
perhaps ultimately astools to further China’s economic development.
Table 1. Key African Dams and NGO Involvement
Sudan (Merowe Dam)
Zambia (Lower Kafue Gorge Dam)
Ethiopia (Tekeze Dam)
Mozambique (Mphanda Nkuwa Dam)
Nigeria (Mambila Dam)
Ghana (Bui Dam)
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Imboulou Dam)
Gabon (Belinga Dam)
Zimbabwe (Kariba Dam)
Kenya (Gibe 3 Dam)
Uganda (Bujagali Dam)

Minimal NGO involvement
Medium NGO involvement
Minimal NGO involvement
High NGO involvement
High NGO involvement
Medium NGO involvement
Minimal NGO involvement
Minimal NGO involvement
Medium NGO involvement
High NGO involvement
High NGO involvement

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
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Economic development continues to be a hot topic in Africa, especially in the SubSaharan region. Energy development in the form of hydropower can be the catalyst to spur
economic development; the question becomes, at what cost or at whose expense (e.g., the poor
rural communities’)? Moreover, what role will (and should) civil-society actors like NGOs play
in Africa’s energy future? Coupled with external forces and actors like the World Bank, vigorous
Chinese investors, and the Chinese government, civil society’s tasks are even more challenging.
As Hathaway and Pottinger (2009:171) point out, “This momentum hinders the ability of civil
society to question the choices being made for Africa’s energy future.” As the above table
illustrates, there is a mixed level of NGO involvement in hydropower economic development in
Africa. It appears that minimal involvement is most evident in relatively unstable politically and
economically fragile African states. [“Fragile” in this article is characterized by a “window of
opportunity . . . for redemption and strengthening if the right diagnosis is made and appropriate
medicines are administered” (Osaghae 2007:697).] This is important because, as the vast majority
of civil-society and development literature suggests, civil-society actors flourish most in stable
countries with mature institutions of governance.
Furthermore, as we have seen, autonomy and independence are relative (i.e., the ability of
civil-society actors in Africa to make a genuine difference and have influence from start to finish
in affected communities), especially when we compare them to the Western paradigm of NGOstate relations. Thus, as globalization and economic growth continue to increase, the richness of
Africa’s political liberalization efforts at the village and local levels may continue to be the
catalyst for nurturing civil rights/liberties. Contrary to a Western-style federalist model whereby
power is divided among branches of government at the national, state, or regional and local
levels, power is being garnered and sustained at the grassroots levels in Africa, and perhaps
African NGOs may be at the vanguard.
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